Proofs of coherence in category theory, starting from Mac Lane's original proof of coherence for monoidal categories, are sometimes based on confluence techniques analogous to what one finds in the lambda calculus, or in term-rewriting systems in general. This applies to coherence results that assert that a category is a preorder, i.e. that "all diagrams commute". This note is about this analogy, paying particular attention to cases where the category for which coherence is proved is not a groupoid.
Introduction
This note is about a connection between the categorial notion of coherence and the notion of confluence found in term-rewriting systems. By coherence we understand the following:
Coherence is a completeness result for an axiomatization of a brand of category, usually with respect to a particular category as a model.
In cases when one expects from coherence to decide whether two terms stand for the same arrow, the model category should be manageable in the sense that there is a decision procedure, preferably elementary, for equality of arrows in it. By varying the model category, we can cover with the notion above the results of Mac Lane and Kelly concerning coherence of monoidal, symmetric monoidal and symmetric monoidal closed categories (see [14] , [15] and [10] ), as well as many other coherence results (see [5] and [6] ).
This notion of coherence is made more precise by taking in the particular brand of category that interests us a category K freely generated by a set of objects (this set may be understood as a discrete category). This free category will always exist if our axiomatization is purely equational. Then coherence amounts to showing the following:
There is a faithful functor G from the free category K to a particular model category M.
In logical terms, the existence of the functor G from K to M is soundness, and the faithfulness of G is completeness proper.
Proofs of coherence in category theory, starting from Mac Lane's original proof of coherence for monoidal categories of [14] , are sometimes based on confluence techniques analogous to what one finds in the lambda calculus, or in term-rewriting systems in general. This applies to coherence results that assert that a category is a preorder, i.e. that "all diagrams commute". (A preordering relation is a reflexive and transitive relation; a category that is a preorder is a preordering relation on the set of its objects.) To make such coherence results accord with the notion of coherence above, in many cases one can take that the image of K in M is a discrete category. In this note we will make some comments on the analogy between proofs of coherence and proofs of confluence, paying particular attention to cases where the category for which coherence is proved is not a groupoid.
and whose arrows are derivations from the sources understood as premises to the targets understood as conclusions, then equality of derivations usually transforms this deductive system into a category of a particular brand. This category has a structure induced by the connectives of the deductive system. Although equality of derivation is dictated by logical concerns, usually the categories we end up with are of a kind that categorists have already introduced for their own reason. The prime example here is given by the deductive system for the conjunction-implication fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic. After derivations in this deductive system are equated according to ideas about normalization of derivations that stem from Gentzen, one obtains the cartesian closed category K freely generated by a set of propositional variables.
Equality of proofs in intuitionistic logic has not led up to now to a coherence result-a coherence theorem is not forthcoming for cartesian closed categories. If we take that the model category M is a category whose arrows are graphs like the graphs of [10] , then we do not have a faithful functor G from the free cartesian closed category K to M.
If η p,q is the canonical arrow from q to p → (p × q), where A → B stands for B A , and w A is the diagonal arrow from
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So if w is a natural transformation, then G is not a functor. Dually, if ε p,q is the canonical arrow from p × (p → q) to q, and k
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e e e e e So if k 1 is a natural transformation, then G is not a functor. The faithfulness of G fails because of a counterexample in [17] . This does not exclude that with a more sophisticated model category M we might still be able to obtain coherence for cartesian closed categories (for an attempt along these lines see Equality of proofs in classical logic may, however, lead to coherence. Coherence is tied up to a point to the generality conjecture concerning identity criteria for proofs, which stems from Lambek's pioneering papers in categorial proof theory of the late 1960s (see [11] for references). These criteria, roughly speaking, say that two derivations represent the same proof when their generalizations with respect to diversification of variables (without changing the rules of inference) produce derivations with the same source and target, up to a renaming of variables.
It is shown in [5] that coherence with respect to the model category Rel whose arrows are relations between finite ordinals could be a plausible motivation for equality of derivations in various systems of propositional logic, including classical propositional logic. The goal of that book was to explore the limits of coherence with respect to the model category Rel. This does not exclude that other coherence results may involve other model categories, and, in particular, with a model category different from Rel, classical propositional logic may induce a different notion of Boolean category than the one introduced in Chapter 14 of [5] . That notion of Boolean category was not motivated a priori, but was dictated by coherence with respect to Rel. The definition of that notion was however not given via coherence, but via an equational axiomatization. We take such definitions as being proper axiomatic definitions.
We could easily define nonaxiomatically a notion of Boolean category with respect to graphs of the Kelly-Mac Lane kind (see [10] ). In this notion, conjunction would not be a product, because the diagonal arrows and the projections would not make natural transformations, and, analogously, disjunction would not be a coproduct (see [5] , Section 14.3.) The resulting notion of Boolean category would not be trivial-the freely generated categories of that kind would not be preorders-, but its nonaxiomatic definition would be trivial. There might exist a nontrivial equational axiomatic definition of this notion. Finding such a definition is an open problem.
We are looking for nontrivial axiomatic definitions because such definitions give information about the combinatorial building blocks of our notions, as Reidemeister moves give information about the combinatorial building blocks of knot equivalence (see [3] , Chapter 1). Our axiomatic equational definition of Boolean category in [5] is of the nontrivial, combinatorially informative, kind. Coherence of these Boolean categories with respect to Rel is a theorem, whose proof in [5] requires considerable effort.
Another analogous example is provided by the notion of monoidal category, which was introduced in a not entirely axiomatic way, via coherence, by Bénabou in [1] , and in the axiomatic way, such as we favour, by Mac Lane in [14] . For Bénabou, coherence is built into the definition, and for Mac Lane it is a theorem. One could analogously define the theorems of classical propositional logic as being the tautologies (this is done, for example, in [4] , Sections 1.2-3), in which case completeness would not be a theorem, but would be built into the definition.
All diagrams commute
The simplest case of coherence is when it asserts that "all diagrams commute", which means that the free category K is a preorder, i.e. a preordering relation on its objects. In this case, some techniques used for proving coherence are related to those developed in connection with term-rewriting systems (cf. [7] and [9] ). The difference is that with coherence we are not interested in proving that starting from an object all paths, i.e. all sequences, of arrows (reductions) obtained by composing terminate in the same normal form. (This may obtain sometimes, but is not essential.) Instead, we are interested in proving that the equality of such paths follows from some basic equations assumed for arrows. So, the level of our interest is not the same. (This is why we need not go so high as [9] in the n-categorial hierarchy.)
Reductions here differ also from reductions in the lambda calculus, where the lambda terms, which correspond to our arrows, are reduced. We do not reduce arrows, but their types.
If all the arrows in question are isomorphisms, then proving that all paths of arrows from the same source to the same target:
e e e whose vertices are all five-letter terms made with one binary operation, and whose edges correspond to single applications of the associativity law. Then the equality of two paths follows from the fact that they are homotopic in the complex. This is the global approach to coherence, which stems from [16] (see also Stasheff's papers in [13] , and references therein).
There is also a local approach to coherence, which stems form [14] . In the term-rewriting terminology, we have to prove that for any two paths of arrows that terminate in the same normal form: For this tiling we proceed inductively in the following manner (see [8] , Lemma 4.3, where the assumption that we deal with isomorphisms is replaced by the weaker assumption that we deal with monomorphism; cf. also [5] , Section 4. At this place, we are faced with all the difficulties that appear in proofs of the Church-Rosser property for a notion of reduction, which consist in listing all the critical pairs of reductions. The difference with what we have in term-rewriting systems is that we must always verify that our tiles are commuting diagrams of arrows. In term-rewriting systems we do not deal with that. (The procedure sketched above works when all the paths starting from the same vertex are bounded in length.) It is not however true that all the interesting cases of coherence where "all diagrams commute" involve only arrows that are isomorphisms (see [12] , [8] , Lemma 4.2, and [5] , Section 4.2; remark that the four-dimensional associahedron has 42 vertices). Consider, for example, arrows whose type A ∧ (B ∨ C) ⊢ (A ∧ B) ∨ C has something to do both with distributivity and associativity, and which in [5] Coherence in this case could perhaps also be deduced from a very general theorem of [2] (Theorem 5.2.4), whose proof is only sketched in that paper, with substantial parts missing. It is not clear whether the proof of [5] (Section 7.3) was envisaged in [2] , and judging by the complexity of particular criteria, as the one mentioned in the preceding paragraph, this seems unlikely.
In cases where such a criterion is not available, the paths of arrows should first be normalized, according to some normalization procedure (this is often a procedure inspired by cut elimination), and then, in order to establish coherence, one has to compare such normalized arrows (see, for example, [10] , [5] , Chapters 7-14, and [6] ). The normal form of paths of arrows need not be unique.
